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LEGISLATION
THE NEW YORK JUDICIAL COUNCIL AND THE LAW REVISION COMMISSION.-
During the regular session of 1934, the legislature of the state of New York
enacted two new bills, one creating a Judicial Council' and the other a Law
Revision Commission.2  The purpose of these two bodies is to examine the
law of the state of New York and to propose reforms and changes to the
legislature.3 The Judicial Council will have for its object the investigation and
reform of the adjective law,--the statutes, and rules of procedure, the operation
of the courts, and the general conduct of judicial business.4 The Law Re-
vision Commission will examine the substantive law of the state, both statutory
and case law, with a view to discovering defects and anachronisms therein.5
Only the Judicial Council is empowered to conduct public hearings,0 but
either body may receive and consider suggestions from any source., Both
were founded as a result of the report of the Commission on the Administration
of Justices which was created by the legislature in 1931.0 The establishment
of these two bodies is by no means the result of sudden and hurried legislation,
but is rather the inevitable outcome of a movement, national in scope, which
has been in steady progress for a number of years. 10 The purpose of this note
is to trace briefly the origin and progress of this movement, and to indicate
the place of a Judicial Council in the governmental scheme.
1. N. Y. JvDiciay LAW (1934) §§ 40-48.
2. N. Y. LFoIsLATv LAW (1934) §§ 70-72.
3. M. Y. JuDiczUay LAW (1934) § 45(e) provides that the Judicial Council shall "rec-
ommend from time to time to the legislature any changes in the organization, jurlsdic-
tion, operation, procedure and methods of conducting business in the courts . . ." N. Y.
Larsr.AT LAW (1934) § 72(5) provides that the Law Revision Commission shall
"report its proceedings annually to the legislature on or before February first, and If It
deems advisable, . . . accompany its report with proposed bills to carry out any of its
recommendations."
4. N. Y. JurnocwY LAW (1934) § 45(a) makes it one of the duties of the Judicial
Council "to make a continuous survey and study of the organization, jurisdiction, proce-
dure, practice, rules and methods of administration and operation of each and all the
courts of the state . . !"
5. N. Y. LEGiSLATIVE LAW (1934) § 72(1) provides that the Commission shall "examine
the common-law and statutes of the state and current judicial decisions for the purpose of
discovering defects and anachronisms in the law and recommending the needed reforms."
6. N. Y. JurDaRY LAW (1934) § 47.
7. N. Y. JuDIcARY LAW (1934) § 45(c); N. Y. LEOiSLAT E LAW (1934) § 72(3).
8. Report of the Commission on the Administration of Justice, Legis. Doc. No. g0
(1934) 36, 53.
9. The Commission was created by N. Y. Laws 1931, c. 186; continued by N. Y. Laws
1932, c. 508; N. Y. Laws 1933, c. 28; N. Y. Laws 1933, c. 261.
10. The first Judicial Council was established in Ohio in 1923, but there are evidences
of the movement of much earlier date. See Wigmore, Wanted, A Judicial Supcrintcndent
(1917) 1 J. Am. Jun. Soc. 7; Rosenbaum, A Mlinistry of Justice (1918) 1 J. AM. Jun. Sec.
155.
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It is hardly necessary to suggest that the law is continually in need of re-
form." As social conditions change, the law must also change. New demands
must be met. Old and outworn ideas must be discarded.' 2 Under the common
law system changes in the law may be made in two ways: by the legislature
enacting statutes; and by the courts rendering new decisions or overruling
old ones.' 3 In the present condition of government, neither method is an
effective medium for reform. Judicial efforts to improve the legal system are
confined by the narrow limits of precedent and analogy;' 4 and besides, the
courts are burdened with an ever-increasing mass of litigation.'r The legislature,
the body which has the power to make swift and sweeping changes, is too
often preoccupied with the steadily-expanding economic and commercial func-
tions of the government, and hence has all too little time to devote to a study
of the condition of the law and the administration of justice.0
Under these circumstances, the need for a separate, permanent agency for
legal reform becomes apparent. There is urgent need for a body which Will
act as an intermediary between the courts and the legislature, which will study
systematically and regularly the needs and problems of the courts, and act as
their ambassador in proposing the desired changes to the law-making body.
The idea of having some permanent functionary of the government, whose
duty it would be to examine the law with a view to reform and simplification, is
not a new one.' 7 The need has been voiced many times, notably by such men
as the late Chief Justice Taft,'8 Mr. Justice Cardozo, 19 and Dean PoundP
In European countries, such bodies have long been in operation.2 ' In the
11. See Cardozo, Ministry of Justice (1921) 35 H ynv. L. REv. 113.
12. For a general discussion of the process of change in the law, in conformity with
changes in social conditions, see CA.nozo, PARADO-XES or L=AL ScxaxcE (1928).
13. SAr o-m, JurspauDENcE (8th ed. 1930) 177.
14. For an illustration of the hesitancy of the courts to break away from anachronistic
rules, see Sternieb v. Normandie Nat. Securities Co., 263 N. Y. 245, 188 N. E. 726 (1934),
in which the court, judge Crane writing, reluctantly holds that an infant, in spite of
fraud in the representation of his age, may disaffirm a contract. The court hints that
a beneficial change might be made by statute. See also Crowley v. Lewis, 239 N. Y.
264, 146 N. E. 374 (1925), where the court refuses to "go behind the seal" to hold an
undisclosed principal.
15. A complete summary of the congestion of the courts of New York State may be
found in the Report of the Commission on the Administration of Justice, Legis. Doc.
No. 50 (1934) 61-71, 79-169.
16. Cardozo, supra note 11, at 113, 115: " ... the legislature, free from these restraints,
its powers of innovation adequate to any need, is preoccupied however, with many issues
more clamorous than those of courts . . .
17. Wigmore, loc. cit. supra note 10.
18. Taft, Possible and Needed Reforms in the Administration of Civil Justice in the
Federal Courts (1922) 6 J. Am JUD. Soc. 36.
19. Cardozo, loc. cit. supra note 11.
20. Pound, Anachronisms in Law (1920) 3 J. Am. JUD. Soc. 142.
21. One such body is the English Rule Committee, which had its origin in the JuDicA-
yuan AcT of 1875, § 17, later modified by the JuDIcATuR Acr of 1894, § 4. Under this
act, the permanent Rule Committee was organized in 1909, consisting of two solicitors,
two barristers, seven judges and the Lord Chancellor.
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United States, however, the desideratum has reached the stage of realization
only during the last eleven years.2 2 But the movement has been rapid. At the
present time more than half the states have set up permanent law reform
bodies23 known as "Judicial Councils." Their work is confined to the correction
of the adjective law, the administration of the courts and the rules of practice
and procedure. New York is the first state to have created a Law Revision
Commission,2 or, as such agencies are more commonly known, a "Ministry
of Justice."2 5  Its purpose is to investigate and correct the substantive law.-0
It is impossible to trace the exact source of the movement directed at the
establishment of Judicial Councils, i.e. adjective law reform bodies, or to name
all the persons and agencies who are responsible for the acceptance of the idea.
The inception of the movement is attributable to the force of the general
opinion of bench, bar and public, than to the efforts of any particular individ-
uals.2 7  However, certain figures provided the needed impetus to translate the
idea into action.
As early as 1914, Chief Justice Taft was advocating the formation of a
council of judges of the federal courts "to consider each year the pending
federal judicial business of the country and to distribute the federal judicial
force" in accordance with the amount of business to be done.28  His efforts
reached their culmination in 1922, when, following an address 20 made by him
to the American Bar Association at its annual meeting, a petition 0 to Congress
was made by the Association proposing the formation of a council of federal
judges to meet annually to expedite the administration of justice and to
alleviate delay in courts. The result was the passage of a bill embodying all
the terms of the petition 1
The American Judicature Society, through the medium of its Journal, has
been a powerful factor in the promotion of the Judicial Council movement. The
22. In 1923 Ohio and Oregon set up the first Judicial Councils. Ohio Laws 1923,
p. 364; Ore. Laws 1923, c. 164.
23. These states are California, Connecticut, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Mary-
land, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Texas, Virginia, Vermont,
Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.
24. N. Y. LEoIsr.ATvE LAW (1934) §§ 70-72.
25. The phrase had its general acceptance after its use by Cardozo, In his Ministry of
Justice (1921) 35 HARv. L. Rav. 113.
26. N. Y. LEomisArIvE LAW (1934) § 72(5).
27. The chief motivating force behind the movement was probably the condition of
the courts. Congestion is practically universal in large cities, and judicial councils seem
to furnish the best solution.
28. See THE JUnIcAL Couxcm, published by the Merchants' Association of New York
(1931) 6.
29. Taft, loc. cit. supra note 18.
30. The petition was printed in 6 J. Am. Jun. Soc. 47 (1922), reading in part:
"Second: That such act shall provide for a permanent Commission . . . with power to
prepare a system of rules of procedure for adoption by the Supreme Court, with power
to amend from time to time."
31. 42 STAT. 838 (1922), 28 U. S. C. A. § 218 (1926).
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Journal began publication in- 1917, and has ever since, through its active
editorial staff, carried on a spirited and successful campaign for the adoption
of Judicial Councils throughout the United States.32 The Bar Associations also,
both state and national, have played an important part in the development.
Ohio was the first state to adopt a Judicial Council.P For many years,
however, it made no apparent progress, as the appropriation in the Ohio
statute amounted to only one thousand dollars for each year. 4 But in 1930
the Institute of Law of Johns Hopkins University collaborated with the Ohio
Judicial Council in a comprehensive study of the condition of the courts.3
In 1931 and 1933 reports were submitted to the legislature,3 0 showing the
results of the work. Among the changes recommended were: unification of the
municipal courts of the state;3 7 several proposals for the reform of appellate
procedure, and a recommendation that full rule-making power be granted to
the supreme court of the state38
Oregon joined the movement in 1923.P9 Here too, the results were slow in
coming, owing to the lack of any appropriation by the legislature.4 0 Since
1929,41 however, the Oregon Council has been covering ground rapidly, its
more notable results being proposals for the elimination of unnecessary delay in
litigation, and the compilation of rather complete tables of the judicial statis-
tics of the state.42
Massachusetts, although its council was not set up until 1924, has become
the real leader in the field.43 In 1919 the Massachusetts Legislature set up a
temporary body, the Judicature Commission, to make a study and to report
proposed changes in procedural law and practice. 4 This Commission made its
report in 1921, and strongly advocated a Judicial Council.u This report is
really the first legislative step taken by any state in the direction of a Judicial
Council, and the action of other states may be attributed in great part to
the work of this commission.
32. Editorials: (1921) 5 J. Am. JuD. Soc. 99; (1922) 6 id. 69; (1923) 7 id. 3; (1923)
7 id. 85; (1924) 7 id. 159; (1924) 7 id. 179; (1924) 8 id. 245; (1925) 9 id. 3; (1925) 9 id.
35; (1925) 9 id. 99; (1926) 10 id. 67; (1926) 10 id. 99; (1929) 13 id. 100; (1930) 14 id. 6.
33. Ohio Laws 1923, p. 364; Oio Gn'L CoDE (Page, 1931) § 1697.
34. Omio GE'L CODE (Page, 1931) § 1697(5).
35. Stwdy of Judicial Administration in Ohio (1930) 13 J. Am JuD. Soc. 140, an
article by the Institute of Law of Johns Hopkins University, outlining the aims of the
study.
36. Report of the Judicial Council of Ohio (1931). Report of the Judicial Council
of Ohio (1933).
37. Report of the Judicial Council of Ohio (1931).
3S. Ruppenthal, The Work Done by Judicial Councils (1931) 17 J. Azs. Jun. Soc. 45.
39. Ore. Laws 1923, c. 149.
40. Ibid. The act fails to provide any appropriation.
41. Report of the Judicial Council (1929) 8 Om. L. REV. 23.
42. Ibid. See also Report of Judicial Council for 1929 (1930) 9 ORE. L. REv. 332.
43. The judicial Council was created by Mass. Gen'l Acts 1924, c. 244, § 34.
44. Mass. Gen'l Acts 1919, C. 223.
45. Second and Final Report of the Judicature Commission (1921) 28.
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The results achieved in Massachusetts constitute the most complete con-
tribution from any state. Each year, since 1925, a comprehensive report has
been published. In each report tables are given showing the condition of
business in the courts and comparing the condition for the year reported
with that of other years. The reports, moreover, are accompanied by sug-
gestions and proposed rules for simplifying and hastening procedure. 40 The
value of such statistics is apparent. They reveal at a glance the condition of
the courts, and, being sufficiently detailed, show exactly where the defects lie.
Many of the recent motor vehicle statutes in Massachusetts are traceable
to the recommendations of the Judicial Council. This is also true of im-
provements in criminal procedure, in the speeding up of appellate business and
trials, and in the greater uniformity of procedure among the courts of the
state. The work of this council, as shown by the results accomplished, was
probably the most important single factor in causing the creation of Judicial
Councils in other states. By 1927, Maryland,47 California, 8 Washington, 49
Connecticut,5" Kansas,51 Rhode Island5 2 and North Dakota,5 3 had established
similar bodies, and at the present writing, the total number of states having
Judicial Councils is twenty-five. 54  Many of the other states are definitely
headed in that direction, although no actual progress in the legislatures has
been reported. Among these are Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Minnesota, Mississippi,
Nebraska and Vermont.
The major achievements of these bodies have been the diminution of delay
in the courts, the simplification and improvement of the rules of practice, and
above all the rapidity and effectiveness with which they have acted in placing
their suggestions before the legislatures. The net result has been a decided
improvement in the administration of justice.
The Law Revision Commission of New York is the first governmental agency
of its kind to have been established in the United States. Its duties are
similar to those of a Judicial Council, except that the field of the Commission
is the substantive law.
It is easier to trace the origin of this body to the endeavors of a particular
few, than in the case of the Judicial Council movement. Two of the men who
have been most directly responsible for the furtherance of the notion of a
ministry of justice, i.e. a substantive law reform body, are Justice Cardozo and
46. Synopses of these annual reports as well as the reports of the Judicial Councils
in all other states may be found in a series of articles: Ruppenthal, loc. cit. supra note 38;
(1930) 14 J. Amr. JuD. SoC. 58; (1930) 14 id. 97; (1931) 15 id. 15; (1931) 15 id. 53;
(1932) 16 id. 14; (1932) 16 id. 51; (1933) 17 id. 45; (1933) 17 id. 24.
47. Md. Acts 1924, c. 549.
48. Cal. Statutes 1925, c. 48.
49. Wash. Laws 1925, c. 45.
50. Conn. Pub. Acts 1927, c. 187.
51. Kan. Laws 1927, c. 187.
52. R. I. Pub. Laws 1927, c. 1038.
53. N. D. Laws 1927, c. 124.




Dean Pound. The former, in his Ministry of Justice,rs' planted the seed which
has finally borne fruit. Nowhere has the need for a substantive law reform
body been better expressed than in this masterly exposition.50 When Cardozo
wrote, the proposal was not novel. As he says, "In European countries the
idea has passed into the realm of settled practice. 0 7  Cardozo's argument,
however, was probably the strongest single factor in bringing the attention of
the bar to the need for a ministry of justice.
At an even earlier date, Dean Pound, in addressing the Conference of Bar
Association Delegates,58 stated the need for "a ministry of justice, charged
with the responsibility of making the legal system an effective instrument of
justice." 9
These eminent jurists, together with one or two others, have been directly
responsible for the development in America, of the ministry of justice idea,
which has finally achieved fulfillment in the creation of the Law Revision
Commission of New York.6t There is small doubt that this body will have as
great a success as the Judicial Councils have had. Some idea of the opportun-
ities open to the new Commission may be gathered from a consideration of the
activities of the American Law Institute, which has been working along sub-
stantially the same lines to be followed by the Commission, although in a
private, non-governmental capacity. The Institute has from time to time pub-
lished restatements of the law6' bringing the common law up to date and
seeking to harmonize it with modem conditions.
The work of the Law Revision Commission will be similar in substance to
these restatements, except that presumably no attempt will be made to codify
those parts of the common law which are found to be satisfactory. According
to the language of the statute,62 the Commission will confine itself to cor-
rection of the law. Its recommendations will take the form of proposals of
bills to the legislature. 63 These bills, as the product of the best legal talent
55. 35 HARv. L. REv. 113 (1921).
56. Ibid.: "On the one side, the judges, left to fight against anachronism and injustice
by the methods of judge-made law, are distracted by the conflicting promptings of justice
and logic, of consistency and mercy, and the output of their labors bears the tokens of the
strain. On the other side the legislature, informed only casually and intermittently of the
problems of the courts, without expert or responsible or disinterested or systematic
advice as to the workings of one rule or another, patches the fabric here and there and
mars often when it would mend. Legislature and courts move on in proud and silent
isolation. Some agency must be found to mediate between them."
57. Supra note 11, at 114.
58. Pound, loc. cit. supra note 20.
59. Id. at 145.
60. N. Y. L==riATmxra LAw (1934) §§ 70-72.
61. E.g., REsTATEmN, AGExcy (1933); REsTATE=m-rT, CorraAcrs (1932); RsxrE-
m=, ToRis (1934).
62. N. Y. LEolsLATrv LAw (1934) § 72(3): "To recommend from time to time such
changes in the law as it deems necessary to eliminate antiquated and inequitable rules of
law, and to bring the law of the state, civil and criminal, into harmony with modern
conditions."
63. N. Y. LwSirsrE LAW (1934) § 72 (5): " . . . and if it deems advisable, to ac-
company its report with proposed bills to carry out any of its recommendations."
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of the state, will come before the legislature with the highest recommendation,
and it is to be expected that they will be considered without delay.
Judge, lawyer and layman may with reason welcome the entry of the
Judicial Council and the Law Revision Commission, long-needed additions to
the judicial branch of government. Divorced from the haste necessarily present
in the bustle of legislative activities, the Council and Commission may reach
their conclusions and formulate their proposals after an orderly analysis and
full consideration of the stated problems. Since the membership of both
bodies is drawn from the foremost ranks of bench and bar the output of the
Council and Commission should be of similar high quality. Provided with
ample funds to investigate thoroughly the shortcomings of substantive, as well
as procedural law, there seems to be warrant for the prediction that the forth-
coming results of this new movement will be of material benefit to the judge
and lawyer: to the judge, in providing him with a system for the better ad-
ministration of the law, and to the lawyer, in giving him a body of law suited to
modern conditions and responsive to the changes in the social order of the
time and place. Finally, to the layman, the individual most directly affected
by the "anachronisms" of the law, are promised the constant revision and re-
consideration of " law in action" to the end that justice may be a fact and not
a mere figure of speech.
THE UNIFORM TRUST RECEIPTS AcT.-By Chapter 574 of the laws of 1934,
the legislature of the state of New York adopted the Uniform Trust Receipts
Act, as finally approved by the Conference of the Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws.' New York is the first state to adopt the Act which is calculated
to make certain a field of law formerly filled with uncertainty, insecurity and
inconsistency.2 To understand properly the scope of the important provisions
of the new Act, it is necessary to review briefly the state of the common law
on the subject.
The Trust Receipt at Common Law
The use of the trust receipt first became prominent in the financing of im-
ports when the buyer bank issued a letter of credit and accepted a draft drawn
by the seller upon presentation of a bill of lading made to the order of the
bank or indorsed to the bank or in blank. The bank, before payment by the
buyer, gave him the bill of lading or the goods in order to permit him to ware-
house, sell or process the latter, and took from him a trust receipt by the terms
of which title to the goods remained in the bank. The device could be used
1. N. Y. PERs. PROP. LAW (1934) §§ 50-581 (effective July 1, 1934). The Uniform Act
was finally approved at the forty-third annual conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws, at Grand Rapids, Michigan, August 22-28, 1933. The Act as finally approved
was the seventh tentative draft. See Report of Committee on Uniform Trust Receipts
Act, 16 Acceptance Bull., No. 8, p. 1. The Uniform Act will be cited hereinafter as
U. T. R. A.
2. See Frederick, The Trust Receipt as Security (1922) 22 COL. L. REv. 395; id. 546;
Vold, Trust Receipt Security in Financing of Saks (1930) 15 Coax. TA Q. 543.
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similarly in domestic transactions. Sometimes the bank would discount the
seller's draft on the buyer and before payment release the goods or bills of
lading against a trust receipt.?
In the above transactions, it is to be noted that the buyer of the goods did
not acquire title thereto until he repaid the banker's advance. The courts
have recognized the existence in the banker of a security title and have protected
that title against the rights of the creditors of the buyer and his trustee in
bankruptcy. This protection has been afforded the banker without recording,
despite the strong resemblance of the transaction to either a conditional sale
or a chattel mortgage.4 Purchasers, pledgees and mortgagees of a negotiable
document of title against which a trust receipt has been issued have, of course,
been protected.? Purchasers, pledgees and mortgagees of the goods them-
selves have been protected if the state in which the transaction takes place has
.a Factor's Act, and the original buyer entrusted has a power of sale.0 When,
however, there is no power of sale, the vendee of goods so entrusted has not
been given the cloak of protection.7 Where it is to be implied from the circum-
stances of the transaction that the party entrusted with the goods or negotia-
ble documents might get the goods and re-warehouse them, a purchaser, mort-
gagee or pledgee of the negotiable document obtained on the re-warehousing
has been held to be protected despite the fact that (in the absence of a Factor's
Act and an authority to sell) he would have gotten no rights by a sale, mort-
gage or pledge of the goods themselves.8
In one jurisdiction the trust receipt transaction has been held to be a condi-
tional sale, but protection was given the banker therein for there was no law
requiring recordation of conditional sales.0 Another case has regarded it as
a chattel mortgagej' In another jurisdiction the recording act has been con-
strued to include in its wording, the ordinary trust receipt transaction."
The purpose of the courts in upholding the banker's security title despite
the lack of recording is obviously based upon the necessity for security in such
financing operations, and the impractibility of requiring burdensome and ex-
3. This was done in Farmers & Mechanics' Bank v. Logan, 74 N. Y. 56S (1878).
4. In re E. Reboulin Fils, 165 Fed. 245 (D. N. J. 1903); In re Cattus, 183 Fed. 251
(C. C. A. 2d, 1910); Century Throwing Co. v. Muller, 197 Fed. 252 (C. C. A. 3d, 1912);
Barry v. Boninger, 40 Md. 59 (1877); Brown Bros. v. Billington, 163 Pa. 76, 29 At. 904
(1894); Mershon v. Moors, 76 Wis. 502, 45 N. W. 95 (1890).
S. Uzrmoaar BmRs or LADING Acr §§ 31, 32; Uro=R Waannousr. RECn s Acr
§§ 40, 41; N. Y. PEns. Pnop. LAW (1911) §§ 217, 218; N. Y. Grzn. Bus. LAW (1909)
§§ 124, 125.
6. Blydenstein v. N. Y. Sec. & Trust Co., 67 Fed. 469 (C. C. A. 2d, 1895). See N. Y.
PLs. PROP. LAw (1909) § 43; Mass. Acts 1845, c. 193; 4 Geo. IV, c. 83 (1823).
7. Moors v. Wyman, 146 Mass. 60, 15 N. E. 104 (1888); Moors v. Kidder, 106 N. Y.
32, 12 N. E. 818 (1887).
8. Commercial Nat'l Bank of New Orleans v. Canal-Louis ana Bank & Trust Co., 239
U. S. 520 (1916).
9. New Haven Wire Cases, 57 Conn. 352, 18 At. 266 (1888).
10. In re Richeimer, 221 Fed. 16 (C. C. A. 7th, 1915).
11. In re Bettman-Johnson Cc., 250 Fed. 657 (C. C. A. 6th, 1918).
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pensive recordation of transactions essentially temporary in their nature.12
But this protection has not been extended so as to veil what is in effect a chattel
mortgage with the outward indicia of a trust receipt transaction, and thus to
safeguard the unrecorded security title. The courts have searched into the
elements of the transaction and have refused to allow the label of a trust
receipt to bestow upon a chattel mortgage the immunities of a trust receipt
transaction.'3 But in attempting to apply a test to determine the essential
nature of a particular transaction, the courts instead of looking toward the
purpose of the transaction, have adopted an arbitrary test. When before
final payment, title is not transferred to the purchaser but is retained by the
banker as security, we have seen that such title is protected as against creditors
and others. 14 Where however, title is acquired by the purchaser in the first
instance and is later transferred to the lender by means of a trust receipt, the
courts have felt constrained to consider the transaction a simple chattel mort-
gage, disregarding entirely the purpose of the transaction, and looking to its
formal elements' 5 In such a case nothing less than taking possession or
recording could validate the transaction.
Where the party entrusted with the goods sells them, the bank can recover
the proceeds of the sale from the buyer' 6 providing he has not already paid
his vendor.' 7 Likewise the bank can follow the misappropriated proceeds as
long as they remain identified.18
Changes Made by the Uniform Act
The new Act begins with a section which defines the terminology employed
throughout.'9 It denominates the party entrusted with the goods, documents
or instruments the "trustee," 20 and the party who takes the trust receipt as
security the "entruster." 21 It goes on to define "buyer in the ordinary course
12. See Report of Committee on Uniform Trust Receipts Act. Proposition 4.
13. In this respect the courts have proceeded in a manner similar to that adopted in
their refusal to give validity to provisions of a lease of personalty, when, in fact, the
transaction purporting to be a bailment or lease, is a conditional sale. Herryford v. Davis,
102 U. S. 235 (1880); Nat'l Cash Register Co. V. Paul, 213 Mich. 609, 182 N. W. 44
(1921); Contractor's Equip. Co. v. Reasner, 242 Mich. 589, 219 N. W. 713 (1928).
14. See notes 5, 6, 8, supra.
15. In re Gerstman, 157 Fed. 549 (C. C. A. 2d, 1907); In re Fountain, 282 Fed. 816
(C. C. A. 2d, 1922); Salinas City Bank v. Graves, 79 Cal. 192, 21 Pac. 732 (1889). But
cf. Commercial Nat'l Bk. of New Orleans v. Canal-Louisiana Bk. & Trust Co., 239 U. S.
520 (1916); In re Dreuil & Co., 205 Fed. 573 (E. D. La. 1913); Fletcher v. Morey, 2 Story
555 (C. C. Mass. 1843).
16. Thayer v. Dwight, 114 U. S. 254 (1870); Dows v. Kidder, 84 N. Y. 121 (1881).
17. Brown Bros. & Co. v. William Clark Co., 22 R. I. 36, 46 Atl. 239 (1900).
IS. First Nat'l Bk. of Auburn v. Eastern Tr. & Banking Co., 108 Me. 79, 79 AtM, 4
(1911) (sale by chattel mortgagor).
19. U. T. R. A. § 1; N. Y. Pms. PROP. LAW (1934) § 51.
20. Id. § 1; N. Y. P.Rs. Ppop. LAW (1934) § 51(14). The definition expressly states
that the word trustee is not used in the sense of the term in equity jurisdiction for of
course he has no title to the matter entrusted.
21. U. T. R. A. § 1; N. Y. PEns. Ppop. LAW (1934) § 51(3).
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of trade," "documents," "goods," "instruments,"2 2  "lien creditor," "new
value," "person," "possession," "purchase," "purchaser," "security interest,"
"transferee in bulk," and "value." These terms will be used throughout the
remainder of this note.
The draftsmen of the Act, with the realization that the trust receipt, as a
form of security, was accorded privileges which the chattel mortgage never
enjoyed, properly assumed that the preferences shown were a result, not of any
substantial difference between the two instruments, but of the factors surround-
ing the nature of the transactions in which the trust receipt was used. In con-
structing the Act, therefore, they took pains to prevent the use of the trust receipt
for any other than specified and limited financing purposes. To warrant
the application of the Act, the agreed purpose of the trustee's possession must
be, in the case of goods and documents of title, to sell, exchange, manufacture
or process with a view to ultimate sale,m and in the case of instrumentsF t to
sell, exchange, deliver to a principal under whom the trustee is holding them,
consummate a transaction involving delivery to a depositary or registrar, pres-
ent, collect or renew.25 Furthermore, it is provided that the Act shall not
apply to isolated transactions not constituting a course of business, where the
entruster is an individual natural person, and the trustee is a fiduciary handling
the investments and finances of the entruster; 2 6 nor shall it apply to trans-
actions of bailment or consignment where the bailor's or consignor's title is
not retained as security for a debt of the bailee or consignee.2 7 The trust re-
ceipt, to be valid as against purchasers from and creditors of the trustee, must
be given to secure an obligation for which the subject matter of the trust
receipt was formerly security, or for new value given or agreed to be given
by the entruster, and a trust receipt given to secure a past indebtedness or a
future obligation will not be given validity as to creditors or purchasers.2
The obvious reason for the above limitations is to prevent the possibility
of validating similar transactions of chattel mortgage and conditional sale
when unrecorded, under the label of a trust receipt. In this respect the drafts-
men have seized upon the essential nature of a trust receipt transaction and
the true reason for its immunity from the recording acts, i.e, the impracticability
of requiring recording in situations the purpose of which is essentially a short
term financing, prior to ultimate turnover and during processing.
Section 3 of the Uniform Trust Receipts ActO- authorizes, in certain cases
which are not trust receipt transactions, the pledge of chattels unaccompanied
22. It is to be noted that negotiable instruments, stock certificates, bonds, interim
certificates, certificates of deposit and other instruments of credit included in this defini-
tion, may be the subject of a trust receipt transaction. See U. T. R. A. § 2(1); N. Y.
Pans. PRoP. LAW (1934) § 52(1).
23. Id. § 2(3) (a) (b) ; N. Y. Pans. Paop. LA W (1934) § 52(3) (a) (b).
24. See note 22, supra.
25. U. T. R. A. § 2(3)(a)(c); N, Y. PEas. Paor. LAw (1934) § 52(3) (a) (c).
26. Id. § 15; N. Y. Pans. PRoi. LAw (1934) § 58g.
27. Ibid.
28. Id. § 14; N. Y. PEgs. Paos. L.xw (1934) § 58f.
29. N. Y. Pans. PRop. LAw (1934) § 53.
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by possession in the pledgee. It gives such pledges validity against creditors
to the extent to which new value is given by the pledgee, for ten days from the
time new value is given.30 If no new value is given, or after the lapse of ten
days after new value given, the pledge is valid against lien creditors without
notice only as of the time the pledgee takes possession, without relation back.A1
Purchasers32 and entrusters of such pledged property, without notice take
free of the pledgee's equities unless he has taken possession prior to the pur-
chase.33 Similar immunity from creditor's rights is given to a pledgee or
lienor in possession, who relinquishes his possession for a temporary or limited
purpose.84 The foregoing provisions, it will be seen, make broader and more
definite the inroads on the common law doctrine that loss of possession defeats
the rights of the lienor or pledgee.35
A contract to give a trust receipt, if signed by the trustee, operates with
reference to goods, documents and instruments delivered to the trustee under
it, as a trust receipt, and is specifically enforcible.30
Section 2 of the Uniform Act which essays to define a trust receipt trans-
action is in some respects complicated and is likely to provide difficulties of
interpretation.3 7 By subsection 1, subdivision (a) the transaction may be one
in which the entruster delivers to the trustee goods, documents or instruments
in which, prior to the transaction, the former had a security interest. This
is the ordinary transaction in which the trustee does not acquire title in the
firsf instance.38  Further, the transaction may be one in which a third party
delivers the goods, documents or instruments to the trustee in which the en-
truster, for new value, by the transaction acquires, or is to acquire promptly,
a security interest. The net result of this subsection would seem to be a reitera-
tion of the common law doctrine giving validity to those cases in which the
trustee has no original title0 (tripartite transactions), and a limited relaxa-
tion of the strict and formal rule requiring that the trustee have no title before
the transaction 40 (bipartite transactions). This relaxation in the light of sub-
30. Id. § 3(1)(a); N. Y. PERs. PROP. LAW (1934) § 53(1)(a). For a definition of
"new value" see U. T. R. A. § 1; N. Y. PERs. PROP. LAW (1934) § 51(7).
31. U. T. R.A. § 3(1)(b); N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW (1934) § 53(1)(b).
32. "A pledgee, mortgagee, or other claimant of a security interest created by contract
is, in so far as concerns his specific security, a purchaser and not a creditor." U. P. R. A.
§ 1; N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW (1934) § 51(11).
33. U. T. R. A. § 3(2); N. Y. Pns. PROP. LAW (1934) § 53(2).
34. Id. § 3(3); N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW (1934) § 53(3).
35. Huntington v. Clemence, 103 Mass. 482 (1870); Moors v. Reading, 167 Mass,
322, 45 N. E. 760 (1897); Black v. Bogert, 65 N. Y. 601 (1875); Johanns v. Ficke, 224
N. Y. 515, 121 N. E. 358 (1918),. But ci. In re Carter, 21 Fed. (2d) 587 (W. D. N. Y.
1927); N. Y. LIEN LAW (1909) § 184.
- 36. U. T. R. A. § 4; N. Y. PRcas. PROP. LAW (1934) § 54.
37. For differences in viewpoint of the matter to be discussed see 16 Acceptance Bull
No. 8, pp. 4, 5; Legis. (1933) 82 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 271, 273; Legis. (1934) 4 Brooklyn
L. Rev. 100, 101, n. 12.
38. See note 4, supra.
39. Ibid.
40. See note 15, supra.
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division (a) would seem only to extend to bipartite cases wherein both trustee
and entruster receive their interests by the same transaction, or where the
entruster receives his interest as a prompt result of said transaction. Thus,
even though the entruster does not get title first, if his title is a result of the
transaction in which the trustee secures his interest, it is valid as a security
interest under the act. The subdivision, read alone, would seem to leave un-
touched the rule of invalidity applicable to cases wherein a trustee having title
gives a trust receipt as security for an advance. 1 But by subdivision (b)
of subsection 1, such bipartite transactions are given validity if the subject
matter of the transaction is intruments4- actually exhibited to the entruster or
his agent, for which he gives new value and takes a trust receipt. To sum up
at this point, Section 2 (1) gives validity to: (1) tripartite transactions;
(2) bipartite transactions where both trustee and entruster derive their inter-
ests as a result of the same transaction; (3) bipartite transactions where
instruments are the subject matter of the transaction, whether or not the en-
truster receives his title as a result of the transaction in which the trustee ac-
quires his interest, providing the transaction is for one of the purposes out-
lined in Section 2(3). The above classification would seem sensible. It departs
from the formalism which rejected all bipartite transactions, and yet guards
carefully against the use of the trust receipt as a chattel mortgage. But we
have seen other safeguards against the latter danger 43 which in themselves
might be sufficient. And furthermore, Section 2 (1), in its main (as distinguished
from its subdivisional) text, boldly states: "The security interest of the
entruster may be derived from the trustee or from any other person, and by
pledge or by transfer of title or otherwise.""4 Does this destroy the limitations
on bipartite transactions set up by Section 2(1) (a) in reference to goods
and documents, and allow validity to any bipartite transaction for new value
providing its purpose is one set out in Section 2(3), and whether or not the
entruster's title is acquired in or results from the transaction which gives rise
to the trustee's interest? It is submitted that the broad statement above
quoted is limited by the more particular requirements of subdivision (a) yet
its presence in the Act is likely to prove the cause of considerable confusion
and conflicting interpretations.45
Rights of Parties Under the Act
Assuming that a trust receipt transaction has been consummated in one of
the ways authorized by Section 2, what are the rights of the parties to it,
their privies, creditors, purchasers and incumbrancers? As between the trustee
and the entruster the terms of the trust receipt are valid and enforcible.Y
41. Ibid.
42. See definition in U. T. R. A. § 1; N. Y. Pins. PRoP. L,,w (1934) § 51(5). See note
22, supra.
43. See notes 24, 25, 26, 27, supra.
44. Italics not in original.
45. As already noted, commentators have differed in their interpretation of § 2. See
note 37, supra.
46. U. T. R. A. § 5; N. Y. Pins. PROP. LAWvr (1934) § 55.
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As against all creditors, the entruster's interest is valid for a period of thirty
days after delivery of the subject of the transaction to the trustee, or if the
transaction be bipartite and involve instruments, for a period of thirty days
from the time that the instruments are exhibited to the entruster or the en-
truster gives new value, whichever is first in point of time.47  After the thirty-
day period recording is required for validity against lien creditors. 48 Among
lien creditors is included one who secures process and levies within a reasonable
time thereafter, and he is deemed a lien creditor from the date of issuance of
said process.49 Assignees for the benefit of creditors,60 equity receivers, trustees
in bankruptcy or insolvency, are considered lien creditors, respectively from the
time of assignment, appointment, and the filing of the petition, whether or
not they have personal knowledge of the transaction.r1 If filing in accordance
with the Act takes place the entruster's interest is valid against creditors02
and if filing takes place after thirty days, the entruster's interest is valid as of
the time of filing, without relation back. 3 The taking of possession has the
same effect as filing, in the case of goods and documents, and of notice of the
entruster's interest, in the case of instruments. 4
The filing required by the Act to give validity to the entruster's interest
after a thirty-day period is simple and answers adequately the needs of the
banker. It consists of filing with the Secretary of Stateo a statement signed
by the entruster and trustee showing the place of business of each, and stating
that they are engaged in trust receipt transactions in a specified type of
goods.56 The filing fee is one dollar 57 and presentation for filing plus the pay-
ment of the fee, constitute filing under the Act as to documents or goods 8
(falling within the description in the statement filed) which are the subject
of trust receipt transactions within a year from the date of filing and have
been the subject of such transactions within thirty days previous to the filing,
between the parties to the statement.50 At the end of the year, or before,
filing may be extended for another year by a similar statement or the affidavit
47. Id. § 8(); N. Y. PRs. PROP. LAW (1934) § 58(1).
48. Id. § 8(2); N. Y. PEas. PROP. LAW (1934) § 58(2).
49. Id. § 8(3); N. Y. PERs. PROP. LAW (1934) § 58(3).
50. See Natl Bank of Deposit v. Rogers, 166 N. Y. 380, 59 N. E. 922 (1901) (assIgnee
for benefit of creditors is not a lien creditor as is a trustee in bankruptcy, and a trust
receipt although unrecorded and originating in a bipartite transaction is valid against him).
51. U. T. R. A. § 8(3) (b) ; N. Y. PERs. PROP. LAW (1934) § 58(3) (b).
52. Id. § 7(1) (a); N. Y. Pans. PROP. LAW (1934) § 57(1) (a).
53. Id. § 7(1) (b) ; N. Y. PaS. PROP. LAW (1934) § 57(1) (b).
54. Id. § 7(2); N. Y. PFns. PROP. LAW (1934) § 57(2). The filing requirements do not
contemplate transactions the subject matter of which consists of instruments. See note
58, infra.
55. U. T. R. A. § 13(1); N. Y. PRS. PROP. LAW (1934) § 58e(1) provides for filing
with the Department of State.
56. U. T. R. A. § 13(1); N. Y. PERs. PROP. LAW (1934) § 58e(1).
57. Id. § 13(3); N. Y. Pans. PROP. LAW (1934) § 58e(3).
58. Filing does not apply to transactions involving instruments. It was evidently the
intention to give such transactions a period of validity not in excess of thirty days.
59. U. T. R. A. § 13(4); N. Y. PaRs. PROP. LAW (1934) § 58e(4).
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of the entruster alone.60 If a transaction is recorded as a chattel mortgage,
or under any act within whose provisions it may come, it need not be filed
as a trust receipt transaction, but such other filing will have no greater effect
than would filing as a trust receipt transaction.,
It will be seen, therefore, that the Act takes cognizance of the temporary
character of trust receipt financing and limits the period of validity, without
recording, to thirty days. In the event that more time is needed an economical
system of filing is provided, designed to satisfy the needs of bankers, and mak-
ing unnecessary a separate filing for each transaction.
Purchasers for value, 2 without notice, of negotiable instruments or docu-
ments subject to trust receipts, are protected against the entruster's interest
regardless of filing.63 In the case of goods, if the trustee has liberty of sale,c'
and liberty of sale includes consent of the entruster to the display of the goods
in the trustee's salesroom or placing them in the trustee's stock in trade, a
buyer in the ordinary course of trade,00 regardless of filing takes free of the
entruster's interest.67  The entruster on such a sale is not liable as a principal
or vendor6 8
Purchasers other than those in the ordinary course of trade,00 take subject
to the entruster's interest,70 except a mortgagee or pledgee who in good faith
and without notice of the entruster's interest and before filing gives new value
before the expiration of the thirty days,71 or gives value after that time,72
or obtains possession of the goods from the trustee before filing, in which
cases the subject matter of the pledge or mortgage is held free of the entruster's
interest. A transferee in bulk7 3 however, in order to take free of the en-
truster's interest, must give new value after the expiration of the thirty-day
period, and have dealt in good faith without notice1 4 Lienors whose specific
liens arise out of the acts of the trustee respecting his business dealings with
the goods in the usual course of business, take an interest prior to that of
60. Id. § 13(5); N. Y. Pims. PROP. L.aw (1934) § S8e(5).
61. Id. § 16; N. Y. Pass. PROP. L.Aw (1934) § 58h. Thus, if filed as a chattel rnort-
gage, it would seem that purchasers in the ordinary course of trade for v-alue, would
nevertheless he protected, although they are not protected as against the mortgagee who
records his mortgage.
62. This includes purchasers on credit. U. T. R. A. § 9(3); N. Y. Pass. PRoP. Lxw
(1934) § 58a(3Y.
63. U. T. R. A. § 9(1)(a); N. Y. Pams. PROP. LAw (1934) § 5Sa(1) (a).
64. Cf. N. Y. PasS. PROP. LAW (1909) § 43 (Factor's Act) and note 6, supra.
65. U. T. R. A. § 9(2) (c) ; N. Y. PaRs. PROP. Lw (1934) § 58a(2) (c).
66. See definition U. T. R. A. § 1; N. Y. Pass. PROP. Lw (1934) § 51(1).
67. Id. § 9(2)(a)(i) ; N. Y. Pass. PROP. LAw (1934) § SSa(2) (a) (i).
68. Id. § 12; N. Y. PFRs. PROP. LAw (1934) § 58d.
69. This includes mortgagees, pledgees and other purchasers. U. T. R. A. § 1; N. Y.
Pass. PROP. LAW (1934) § 51(11).
70. U. T. R. A. § 9 (2)(b); N. Y. Pams. PROP. L.W (1934) § 5Sa(2)(b).
71. Id. § 9(2) (b) (i); N. Y. Pas. PROP. LAw (1934) § 5Sa(2) (b) (i).
72. Id. § 9(2)(b)(ii); N. Y. Pas. PROP. LAw (1934) § 58a(2)(b)(ii).
73. See definition U. T. R. A. § 1; N. Y. PaRs. PROP. IMw (1934) § 51(13).
74. U. T. R. A. § 9(2) (b); N. Y. Pas. PROP. L.%w (1934) § 58a (2) (b).
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the entruster, regardless of filing.76 The Act provides that documents, instru-
ments or goods substituted for documents, instruments or goods originally en-
trusted are to be treated as if they were originally entrusted. 70 In short it
adopts unequivocally the doctrine of Commercial Bank v. Canal Bank,"7 and
goes further in not requiring that the permission to re-warehouse or to obtain
documents or instruments in substitution, be implied from the circumstances
of the original transaction.
The entruster is subrogated to the rights of the trustee against a purchaser
on credit,78 but being a mere substitute, his right is subject to any set-off or
defense, valid against the trustee. 79 Where the trustee has no liberty of sale
or other disposition, or having liberty of sale, is required by the terms of the
trust receipt to account to the entruster for the proceeds of any disposition of
the subject matter of the trust receipt, the entruster is entitled, as against
the trustee, to the proceeds of the disposition, whether identifiable or not, to
the extent of his interest.80 As against the trustee's creditors or trustee in
bankruptcy, the entruster is entitled to any proceeds, whether or not identifi-
able, which were received by the trustee within ten days prior to either an
application for the appointment of a receiver of the trustee, or the filing of a
petition in bankruptcy or insolvency by or against the trustee, or a demand by
the entruster for an accounting, providing the entruster's interest was valid
as against the creditors or trustee in bankruptcy at the time of the disposi-
tion.8 In any event, the entruster is entitled to identifiable proceeds unless
he has waived the provision for an accounting.82 Failure to demand an ac-
counting within ten days from the time the entruster receives knowledge of the
disposition operates as a waiver.88
Entruster's Remedies
The Act sets up a simple and inexpensive system of foreclosure.8 4 Upon de-
fault the entruster is entitled to possession of the subject matter of the trans-
action,s5 and he may take possession upon default without process, unless, in
order to do so, he must commit a breach of the peace.80 After such possession
he may give five days notice of sale,87 and sell the goods, documents or instru-
75. Id. § 11; N. Y. PEas. PROP. LAW (1934) § 58c (does not include landlord's lien).
Cf. N. Y. LnsN LAW (1909) § 184.
76. U. T. R. A. § 9 (1)(b); N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW (1934) § 58a (1)(b).
77. 239 U. S. 520 (1916).
78. U. T. R. A. § 9 (3); N. Y. PEas. PROP. LAW (1934) § 58a(3).
79. Ibid.




84. Id. § 6; N. Y. PEas. PROP. LAW (1934) § 56.
85. Id. § 6 (1); N. Y. PERs. PROP. LAW (1934) § 56(1).
86. Id. § 6(2); N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW (1934) § 56(2).
87. Notice is sufficient ff in writing and served upon the trustee or sent by mall to Iia




ments at private or public sale with the privilege of himself purchasing, if the
sale be public.8 8 The proceeds of such sale are applied to the payment of (1)
sale expenses, (2) expenses of retaking and storing and (3) satisfaction of
the indebtedness8 9 The trustee is entitled to any surplus monies and is like-
wise liable for any deficiency. 90  A bong fide purchaser for value at such
foreclosure sale takes free of the trustee's interest even though the entruster,
because of irregularities of procedure or other reason, is liable to the trustee for
conversion.Pl
No provision for forfeiture of the trustee's interest is valid9 2 except where
the subject matter of the transaction consists of articles manufactured by
style or model, and then the trust receipt may provide for forfeiture of the
trustee's interest against complete cancellation of the trustee's indebtedness
if the remaining indebtedness is eighty per cent or more of the purchase price
or the original indebtedness, whichever is more.9 3 In the case of the first
renewal of the indebtedness only seventy per cent need be cancelled, and in
further renewals only sixty per cent.94
Conclusion
The Act as a whole, so far as its construction is concerned, is somewhat
complicated. That is to say, structural and formal details make quick and
easy analysis difficult. But this is a fault of all compendious codifications.
The constant reference within provisions of the Act to other sections of the
Act does nothing more harmful than make the analyst refer to and re-digest
the other sections.
As to substance, the Act effects, in most part, its purpose to make definite
many situations heretofore conjectural. It, furthermore, makes the law emi-
nently more just for all parties concerned in trust receipt transactions. To
the entruster or banker, it gives protection in certain transactions where title
happens first to get to the trustee;9 5 it gives him a thirty-day period of pro-
tection without filing,96 and after that period* provides convenient, inexpensive
and workable filing procedure;9 7 it subrogates him to the trustee's rights
against a purchaser; 98 allows him to follow identifiable proceeds;'9 gives him
a preference for proceeds received by the trustee within ten days before the
88. U. T. R. A. § 6(3) (b); N. Y. PERs. PRop. Lkw (1934) § 56(3) (b).
89. Ibid.
9o. Ibid.
91. Id. § 6(3)(c); N. Y. PEss. PROP. LAw (1934) § 56(3)(c).
92. Id. § 5; N. Y. PEsS. PROP. LAw (1934) § 55.
93. Id. § 6(5); N. Y. PEss. PROP. LAw (1934) § 56(5).
94. Ibid.
95. Id. § 2(1)(a)(b); N. Y. Ps. PRoP. LAw (1934) § 52(1)(a)(b).
96. Id. § 8(1); N. Y. PaRs. PROP. LAW (1934) § 58(1).
97. Id. § 13; N. Y. PERs. PROP. LAW (1934) § 58e.
98. Id. § 9(3); N. Y. Pass. PROP. LAw (1934) § 58a(3).
99. Id. § 10(c); N. Y. PasS. PROP. LAw (1934) § 58b(c).
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filing of a petition in bankruptcy,10 and provides inexpensive and workable
procedure for foreclosure. 10
As respects the trustee, the Act allows him to finance his operations inex-
pensively and quickly and without impairment of his credit standing, allows
certain transactions to be consummated which at common law would require
filing as chattel mortgages, 0 2 and protects him against forfeiture of his equity
of redemption.'0 3
It protects purchasers of documents and instruments entrusted and those
procured in substitution therefor, 04 and, if there be liberty of sale, it protects
purchasers of goods.' 0 5 This protection is available whether the trust receipt
be filed as such,'0 0 or under any other filing statute.10 7 It subordinates the
entruster's rights to those of lienors in the course of business.' 08
Creditors of the trustee are protected by a filing requirement after thirty
days from the day of entrusting and this provides an easy method of checking
up on the trustee's credit status. 00 At the same time the filed statement re-
veals nothing of the details of the trustee's transactions but merely apprises
the prospective buyer or creditor of the existence of such transactions. Filing
or taking possession after the thirty-day period does not defeat creditor's
rights by relation back." 0 The rights of the entruster against creditors are
limited to the new value given by him or to his previous interest in the subject
matter of the trust receipt."' A creditor is deemed a lien creditor from the
date of process issued providing it is thereafter served," 2 and likewise deemed
are the general creditor's representatives in insolvency proceedings."n
The Act is a necessary adjunct to The Uniform Sales Act, The Uniform Con-
ditional Sales Act, The Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act, The Uniform
Bills of Lading Act and The Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act. Its speedy
adoption in all jurisdictions would be another step toward uniformity and
certainty in commercial law, a step which, in view of the interstate nature of
our domestic commerce and the frequent occurrence of trust receipt questions
in federal bankruptcy litigation, is highly desirable.
100. Id. § 10(b); N. Y. PEs. PROP. LAW (1934) § 58b(b).
101. Id. § 6; N. Y. PERs. PROP. LAW (1934) § 56.
102. Id. § 2(1)(a); N. Y. PEgs. PROP. LAW (1934) § 52(1)(a).
103. Id. § 5; N. Y. PERs. PROP. LAW (1934) § 55.
104. Id. § 9(1) (a) (b); N. Y. PERs. PROP. LAW (1934) § 58a(1) (a) (b).
105. Id. § 9(2)(a); N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW (1934) § 58a(2)(a).
106. Id. § 9(2)(a)(i); N. Y. PEs. PROP. LAW (1934) § 58a(2)(a)(i).
107. Id. § 16; N. Y. PERs. PROP. LAW (1934) § 58h.
108. Id. § 11; N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW (1934) § 58c.
109. Id. §§ 8, 13; N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW (1934) §§ 58, 58e.
110. Id. § 7; N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW (1934) J 57.
111. Id. § 14; N. Y. PEs. PROP. LAW (1934) § 58f.
112. Id. § 8(3) (a); N. Y. PERs. PROP. LAW (1934) § 58(3) (a).
113. Id. § 8(3)(b); N. Y. PERs. PROP. LAW (1934) § 58(3)(b).
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